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Why has the Eurozone crisis affected Southern European countries more severely than Northern
European countries? Benedicta Marzinotto writes that it is necessary for monetary and fiscal
policies to complement structural factors within an economy, such as labour market institutions. She
argues that the transition to the euro created problems for Southern European countries as the
single currency’s macroeconomic regime was at odds with some of the structural features of these
economies. In contrast, countries like Germany were shielded from these problems because the
new system was similar to the previous German model.
There is a tendency in the economics profession of treating macroeconomics and structural issues
as two separate compartments, each governed by a different logic. So, whilst monetary and fiscal policy tend to be
depicted as universal sets of instruments that could be employed anytime anywhere with the same impact on the
economic cycle, structural issues such as labour markets and welfare states are rightly regarded as socially
embedded, inertial and “reformable” only with the support of the very same forces that have until then determined
their inertia.
This vision is conveniently endorsed by policy-makers
including those that participated in the construction of
the euro, which was at least in the early days about
rendering sovereignty over “universal” tools, whilst
retaining control over sensitive areas (e.g., labour
markets, education systems and welfare states). Yet, macroeconomic policies are embedded in national institutional
settings too and interact with other institutions of each national political economy, especially labour markets, in more
or less efficient ways.
Much of the crisis dynamics can be explained by the fact that the institutional complementarity between
macroeconomic and structural policies could be preserved in some cases, whilst it was not redefined or improved in
others. Before the euro, Germany was the clearest example of a virtuous institutional complementarity between
macroeconomic policies and labour markets. Wages were set at the sectoral level meaning that there were relatively
few wage setters, say, one per sector. The risk was that each medium-sized wage setter could ask for strong wage
increases, thereby almost certainly creating inflation.
But two factors prevented this from happening. First, the German macroeconomic regime was non-accommodating.
The Bundesbank would have reacted to excessive inflation reducing money supply, with dismal consequences for
employment. Second, of all sectors, the export-oriented one was the lion’s share. Labour unions in the
manufacturing sector were deeply committed to wage moderation, as a restrictive response by the national central
bank would have led to currency appreciation besides everything else, magnifying output costs.
Fiscal policy was equally rigid, as it could not override the objective of monetary policy. Rigid fiscal rules were also
necessary to ring-fence the system from the possibility of free riding by public sector unions, who had little reason
for self-discipline, as their jobs were not a function of interest and exchange rates.
Scandinavian countries worked equally well. Up to the 1980s, wages were set at the national level, which
guaranteed both wage moderation and wage compression. With virtually one wage setter, there was no advantage
from having a rigid macroeconomic regime, as there was no risk of free-riding. The single wage setter was self-
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disciplined because excessive wage growth would have immediately translated into inflation, thereby also leaving
workers’ purchasing power unchanged. The macroeconomic regime in these countries was thus essentially
accommodating and supportive of employment creation.
When wage bargaining became more decentralised in the late 1980s and more similar to the German system,
macroeconomic policy rules were introduced including in countries that were not participating in the European
monetary union (e.g. Sweden). So, here, the regime change was largely endogenous, with countries moving from
one institutional equilibrium to another, which was equally efficient.
The South of Europe deserves special attention. Prior to joining the euro, national systems were not necessarily as
efficient and equitable as they were in Germany or Scandinavia, but they had their own internal consistency. So, for
example, public debts were generally high, but few wage setters and powerful labour unions contributed to strong
inflationary pressures. This ended up creating substantial problems over time, but also helped reduce the real
obligations of future generations in countries where, for most of the post-war period, the stock of public debt was
domestically owned.
That macroeconomic regimes must have some complementarity with labour market institutions was also well
understood in these countries. For example, in Italy, once the policy of monetising the public debt was ended in the
early 1980s, serious budget reforms were put on the table and wage indexation was first softened and then fully
scrapped in the early 1990s.
The European monetary union was a shock for two reasons. First, all public debt suddenly became foreign debt.
Now there are only two possible strategies to support debt sustainability: fiscal adjustment to eliminate the problem
at its source, or enhanced competitiveness to create the conditions for repaying debt through exports. The latter
requires supportive labour market institutions, but it also comes with short-term costs because the immediate effect
of lower relative prices is to increase the value of the debt and hence the share of exports necessary to repay it.
Second, countries such as Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal and, to a much lesser extent, Italy, moved from
macroeconomic regimes characterised by high interest rates but the option of devaluation, to the euro regime,
where devaluation is not possible, but interest rates up to the crisis were extremely low, reflecting abundant money
supply. This de facto accommodating monetary regime went hand in hand with wage setting institutions that were
neither fully decentralised nor fully centralised, but somewhere in between, and thus inconsistent with prevailing real
monetary conditions. They also lacked an export-oriented sector that was strong enough politically and institutionally
to impose discipline on other sectors, and which was ultimately capable of repaying the huge stock of debt that had
become “foreign” all of a sudden.
By contrast, the euro’s macroeconomic regime was no shock to a country like Germany because it turned out to be
akin to the previous one, with the result that the complementarity with the existing labour market institutions could be
fundamentally preserved.
Macroeconomics does not operate in a vacuum and varieties of capitalism offer a valuable analytical tool to
understand the build-up of macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area. To be efficient, coordination of economic
policies in Europe requires understanding all of these complex institutional knots in each country.
Research behind this piece was conducted before the author joined the European Commission. The views
expressed in this piece do not represent the view of the EU.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
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